6 Gender and sexual diversity organizing in Africa

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Introduction

Debates among social movement scholars have generated diverse approaches to the study of social movements. Over the past few decades, scholars based in North America and Western Europe have generated different ways to study social movements, including the resource-mobilization (RM) approaches (McCarthy and Zald 1977), political process model (PPM) (McAdam 1999), framing theories (Benford and Snow 2000), and new social movements (NSM) theorizing (Melucci 1989). Scholars drawing on PPM tend to focus on movement interactions with governments and institutional politics (McAdam 1999; Tilly 1978). RM approaches explain the formalization of movements with their own organizational logics (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Olson 1965). Framing perspectives illuminate how leaders and adherents develop messages that motivate people to join and support movements (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson 1992). NSM perspectives elucidate the cultural origins of movements in post-industrial Western nations challenging social marginalization experienced by groups such as women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) persons (Buechler 2011).

Although these approaches have sparked productive exchanges between social movement scholars, they have generated an artificial division between politics and culture ill suited for studying “awkward” movements that transcend this distinction. By “awkward” movements, Francesca Polletta (2006: 275) means movements “whose composition, goals, or tactics make them difficult to study or theorize.” Awkward movements contest the scholarly assumption that culture exists independently of political structures when, in fact, according to Polletta (2004: 100), culture, “as the symbolic dimension of all structures, institutions, and practices,” structures political processes. In other words, awkward movements reveal how culture and politics are inseparable from one another. LGBTI organizing constitutes an awkward movement, not because activists challenge heteronormative sociopolitical formations, but rather because activism benefiting African gender and sexual minorities emerges in multiple locations simultaneously: in photographic contestations of black queer invisibility (Baderoon 2011), in courts (Mukasa 2010), in LGBTI pride marches (Nyanzi...
needs of HIV-positive gender and sexual minorities illuminate the profound daily struggles in which activists are engaged. These survival strategies exceed the classification of “identity movements.”

**Culture, politics, and public visibility**

As gender and sexual diversity has mushroomed into a contentious issue in countries throughout Africa, managing the public visibility of LGBTI persons, SMOs, and movements has become a major concern for activists (Currier 2012; Epprech 2013; Reid 2013; Thomann 2014; Tucker 2009). Activists confront the misconception that the presence of same-sex relationships and gender variance in African societies stems from Western colonialism or neocolonial interference in the forms of gay tourism and global public health. The rapid growth in indigenous LGBTI organizing prompted some religious and state leaders to speculate that foreign interests were fueling local activism by funneling funds to LGBTI SMOs. Political, religious, and traditional leaders interpreted Western governments’ link of development assistance to recognition of sexual minority rights negatively. In December 2011, then-United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton unveiled President Barack Obama’s support for LGBTI rights (Myers and Cooper 2011). Some African leaders regarded this announcement as involving the withholding of foreign aid from their countries if they did not recognize LGBTI rights (Pflanz 2011).

African leaders also viewed NGOs that received foreign funding as pawns of Western nations. For instance, Malawian religious and traditional leaders shared this perspective. “Following the withdrawal of aid by donors, chiefs and some religious leaders have … demonis[ed] NGOs for accepting money from donors ‘to impose a foreign culture on Malawians’” (Kasunda 2012: 3). This quotation illustrates how LGBTI organizing transcends the social movement studies distinction between culture and politics, one that Northern scholars began interrogating in the late 1990s (Goodwin and Jasper 2004; Polletta 1997). This scholarly debate involves jettisoning the unhelpful division between culture and (political) structure and not presuming that social movement actors recognize this distinction (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). Building on these new perspectives, we propose that it makes sense to understand African gender and sexual diversity movements as involving multiple cultural and political targets within and outside of a specific national context.

Within many African nations, LGBTI activists confront “homosexuality-is-un-African” tropes, rhetoric that alleges lived gender and sexual diversity and LGBTI organizing are not indigenous to African societies (Currier 2012). In particular, the postcolonial and postindependence emergence of LGBTI activism has generated local opposition to LGBTI rights organizing. For instance, Malawian President Bingu wa Mutharika averred that the rise of gay rights organizing stemmed from Western nations’ meddling in the nation’s sovereign affairs. Mutharika’s allegations contributed to political divisions within Malawian civil society. Wanting to repair relations with Mutharika’s administration, some
leaders of different social movements pressured LGBTI activists and supporters to scale back their activism; they worried that LGBTI SMOs were endangering the political standing of all civil society organizations (Currier 2014). Such claims have required LGBTI SMOs to develop visibility strategies that simultaneously challenge misconceptions in public arenas about gender and sexual diversity and insulate activists and constituents from scrutiny and threats of bodily harm.

Many scholars writing about LGBTI movements in Western contexts first assume that these movements opt to “come out” in public (Chabot and Duveendak 2002). This premise is linked to the metaphor of visibility implicit in much social movement literature (Doerr et al. 2013), which presumes that social movement emergence amounts to groups accruing enough internal momentum and/or external interest that they achieve public visibility with their actions or statements. In this sense, all LGBTI movements must evolve in the direction of public visibility if they are to succeed. However, there is danger in promoting a single model of social movement evolution, particularly of LGBTI movement development in the global South, because it may lead scholars to assume that Southern movements are “defective in political consciousness and maturity” (Alexander 2005: 28). Instead, many activists opt for fluid forms of visibility that do not always align with global Northern tropes of liberation and equality.

In addition, scholars assume that once LGBTI SMOs and individuals “come out”, they remain out. Social movement scholarship, especially Verta Taylor’s (1989) work on the abeyance structures of the U.S. women’s movement that sustained the movement during its doldrums, dispels this assumption. In politically hostile circumstances, activist groups may recede from public visibility or limit their visibility so that they can pursue projects without harassment from the state or other opponents. This occurred in South Africa. Mark Gevisser (1995) chronicles the ebb and flow of lesbian and gay organizing from the 1960s to the mid-1990s in South Africa, offering evidence that the apartheid government’s repression of social movements led to the disappearance of lesbian and gay activist groups.

Individuals may be “out” publicly as gender and sexual minorities with friends, family, and coworkers, but SMOs may not be so visible to the public or even to the gender and sexual minority community. Activists may preserve the SMO’s anonymity so that they can offer discreet counseling services to gender and sexual minorities and persons living with HIV/AIDS or withdraw from public view to refashion the SMO’s objectives and strategies (Tucker 2009). Invisibility may have its rewards for groups because if they re-emerge to the general public and to LGBTI community, they may appear revitalized and obtain more political clout. LGBTI SMOs work to preserve their public credibility, due to the unfavorable attention gender and sexual diversity receives. LGBTI activists are not only concerned with the public visibility and representation of LGBTI persons in African nations, but are also interested in how, when, and by whom movements and SMOs are seen. By controlling how audiences perceive SMOs, activists can also control how audiences see the movement (Currier 2012).

Some African LGBTI SMOs neutralize threats internal to the movement if activists believe that certain actions will endanger gender and sexual dissidents and weaken the entire movement. In the late 1990s, the South African National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE) moved to isolate the upstart Gay and Lesbian Alliance (GLA), a shadowy lesbian, gay, and bisexual group. In 1998, the GLA sought to register as a political party with the Independent Electoral Commission, a development NCGLE leaders interpreted as potentially undermining the NCGLE’s partnership with the ruling political party, the African National Congress (Currier 2010). The NCGLE tempered the symbolic threat that the GLA’s formation of a political party constituted by reminding LGBTI South Africans of the GLA’s odious support for reinstating the death penalty. The GLA’s support for the death penalty contradicted the LGBTI movement’s stance on decriminalization and legal reform. The NCGLE contended, “[N]o responsible lesbian or gay leader or thinking democrat [would] support the death penalty” in post-apartheid South Africa due to the historic criminalization of male-male sexuality (Achmat 1999: 23). In fact, “gay men were executed for sodomy in South Africa” until 1871 (Achmat 1999: 23). By rejecting the reinstatement of the death penalty, the NCGLE portrayed the movement as moving away from an antigay and racist past, not reviving it.

Examining the tactics African LGBTI movements use demonstrates how their tactical selection transcends the culture-politics distinction. Offering a sophisticated theoretical model of tactical choice, Verta Taylor and Nella Van Dyke (2004: 268) differentiate among “contestation, intentionality, and collective identity” as factors that determine the tactics available and of interest to activists. First, some activists favor more confrontational tactics of contestation “in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations” (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004: 268). The Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe’s repeated attempts to set up a booth at the Zimbabwe International Book Fair in the mid-1990s stand out as challenges to President Robert Mugabe’s claim that sexual minorities were unwelcome in Zimbabwe and as assertions of LGBTI persons’ interest in seizing public space (Goddard 2004).

Second, LGBTI activists are keenly aware of the potential effects of the tactics they select and intentionally choose optimal tactics for their goals. From 1994 to 1996, NCGLE leaders lobbied for the retention of the sexual-orientation nondiscrimination clause — the Equality Clause — in the constitution in the media and ruled out “a campaign of civil disobedience… because the ANC [African National Congress] was programmatically committed to lesbian and gay equality” (NCGLE 2005: 214). Through persistent campaigning dating back to the late 1980s, lesbians and gay men active in the anti-apartheid struggle had persuaded ANC leaders to lend support for the Equality Clause. Direct-action tactics likely would have backfired, as they would have generated the false impression that the NCGLE and ANC were enemies, when in reality, they were allies. Behind-the-scenes lobbying appealed as a tactical choice because the ANC had already expressed support publicly for sexual minority equality.
Not all tactics won over South African LGBTI activists in the 1990s. Discussions about race, gender, and sexual dissidence erupted in LGBTI social circles about Steven Cohen’s queer artistic performances (du Plessis 2006; Hoad 2007: 68–69). At the 1996 Pride march, Cohen and Vasili Kapetanakis carried a banner that read, “Give us your children. What we can’t fuck, we eat” (de Waal and Manion 1998: 98). Zackie Achmat (1996) dismisses this banner as a failed queer protest attempt in South Africa because its white, middle-class carriers could afford to engage in such public transgression, which he viewed as divorced from racial, gender, and sexual inequalities and violence. By extension, it would have been impossible for black queer persons to engage in this tactic, an example of how class positions and racial identities structure activist access to protest tactics.

Third, fashioning and revising collective identity is an activity that informs SMOS’ tactical choices. In some places, LGBTI activists confronted allegations that homosexuality was un-African, prompting activists to engage in public education to correct misconceptions about gender and sexual dissidents. In this way, activists challenged negative “homosexual” identities imposed externally on sexual minorities by misguided opponents. African participants in the annual Johannesburg Lesbian and Gay Pride parade reinvented traditional African dress as drag in an attempt to demonstrate that homosexuality was African (Spruill 2004). In the mid-2000s, the Rainbow Project in Namibia sponsored a call-in radio show named “Talking Pink” that educated Namibians about LGBTI people (Currier 2012).

These examples illustrate that LGBTI movements in the global South are not mimicking Northern gender and sexual diversity movements, but instead are responding to local interactions with religious, state, and traditional leaders. In Côte d’Ivoire, sexual minorities draw on a flexible language, sometimes self-identifying using terms such as the English “gay” and the French “homo,” while other times employing a coded, local lexicon of same-sex practice known as woubi-can (Thomann 2014). Many men who have sex with men and travestis refer to themselves as les branchés. In French, the verb brancher means “to plug in,” and people use it as slang for those who are “hip” or “cool,” suggesting that branchés are “plugged in” to popular culture. In Abidjan, branchés employ the word branché in public settings to connote sexually non-normative practices and/or identities, without passers-by comprehending its hidden meaning. Such local terminology suffuses and enlivens the social spaces of LGBTI SMOS, which constitute the paradigmatic “safe spaces” in which movement constituents explore their common sociopolitical interests (Morris and Braine 2001: 30).

**Movement funding and patronage**

The transnational dynamics of patronage and funding illustrate the neoimperialist dilemmas that many African gender and sexual diversity movements face. Social movement theory has tended to portray the funding of social movements as resulting in corporate, donor, or government cooptation and activist demobilization (Jalali 2013; Piven and Cloward 1977). According to this argument, social movements that receive corporate, donor, or government funding must fulfill funders’ demands, which can entail deferring pressuring campaigns or reframing movement grievances in language intelligible to funders (King 2006). Not only do these actions undermine the moral principles guiding movement activity, but they can also involve promoting funder priorities over movement priorities (Chasin 2000). With time, movement priorities might recede in importance, resulting in demobilization. Although cooptation and demobilization are possible movement outcomes, without evidence from movements in the global South, scholarship will continue to overlook the complex, interlocking systems of patronage and funding in which LGBTI organizing has become embedded.

Research on NGOs and the non-profit industrial complex has yielded helpful perspectives on the formalization of African gender and sexual diversity movements. Transnational feminist scholars have documented the rise of NGOs in feminist and women’s rights organizing around the world, dubbing this development as “NGOization” (Alvarez 1998; Bernal and Grewal 2014). NGOization has also transformed African LGBTI organizing, enticing activists into adopting this organizational form. Tshepo Madlingozi (2014: 99) describes professionalized NGOs as having “marginalised” constituents, “permanent, salaried staff,” and “fixed and well-resourced offices,” as relying on “donor support,” and as having registered with the government, a portrait that applies to many LGBTI NGOs throughout Africa. NGOization engenders new possibilities for and limitations on LGBTI organizing (Blessiot 2013).

Scholars treat the non-profit industrial complex as a set of symbiotic relationships that grant state and non-state entities control over social movements through the management and control of dissent (Rodriguez 2007; Smith 2007). Central to the critiques of the non-profit industrial complex is an appraisal of NGO governance. With many U.S. NGOs operating as intermediaries between donor institutions and community-based NGOs in the global South, “power” lies in the hands of members of the board of directors of Northern NGOs. Boards determine a Northern organization’s mission statement and goals, participate in financial audits, help raise funds, and make decisions about personnel. When organizations enter into a relationship with larger non-profits and funding institutions, activists at community-based NGOs must adopt a non-profit model and engage in a corporate restructuring of labor that channels activists into narrowly defined roles (Rodriguez 2007: 26). Furthermore, the tendency of agendas from the global North to be victim- and issue-specific ensures that movements are circumscribed by both “identity” (e.g., sexual minorities) and by the type of injury (e.g., AIDS). Thus, the bounded nature of what is “fundable” makes coalition approaches difficult (Spade 2011: 33).

Some critics aver that Northern funding advances “the imperialist agenda of global gay politics,” a politics that aims to liberate sexual and gender dissidents from “traditions” that privilege procreative heterosexuality and gender conformity by providing them with stable Western gender and sexual identities and politics that will usher them into modernity (Dhawan 2013: 191). However, this
criticism minimizes the strategic choices of African LGBTI activists who view foreign funding, albeit from a position of constrained agency, as their best opportunity for furthering their movement objectives. It is true that “external events and institutions directly affect how … [activists] see their position, the possibilities and limits of change, and the dilemmas they face,” but the external sociopolitical environment does not force activists to accept unwanted donor funding (Robnett 2002: 268). Many African LGBTI activists recognize the need to procure foreign funding, as few, if any, local sources of funding exist.

In the summer of 2013, foreign funding contributed to the emergence of a moral panic around homosexuality in Abidjan. In late June, the French embassy gave a US$50,000 grant to Alternative-Côte d’Ivoire (Alternative), Côte d’Ivoire’s leading HIV/AIDS and LGBTI SMO. The ceremony celebrating the grant, which the French ambassador attended, was closed to the media. After the event, activists uploaded hundreds of event photos to Facebook. Ivorian journalists downloaded pictures from prominent activists’ Facebook pages. A few days later on June 27, U.S. President Obama landed in Dakar, Senegal, hours after the repeal of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) by the U.S. Supreme Court, where an international press corps asked for his comment on the repeal. With Senegalese President Macky Sall at his side, President Obama called the ruling a “victory for American democracy” and chastised Sall and other African leaders on their countries’ LGBTI rights records (Shear 2013).

In Abidjan, news coverage of the ceremony at Alternative’s headquarters broke the same day as Obama’s comments in Dakar and added to a growing sentiment that the Obama administration sought to push gay marriage on countries throughout the continent. Between June 27 and July 1, Ivorian daily newspapers featured nearly a dozen articles on homosexuality. Some articles denounced LGBT people in the country, and others accused the French and U.S. governments of pushing same-sex marriage on Côte d’Ivoire. France’s legalization of same-sex marriage in May 2013 contributed to speculation that France was exporting same-sex marriage to Francophone African nations, evidenced by the French embassy’s grant to Alternative. Articles portrayed Alternative’s funding from the French Embassy as evidence of Western efforts to impose their values on Ivorians through economic coercion.

The drama continued to unfold in the Ivorian press when Minister for Public Affairs and Administrative Reform Gnamién Konan was quoted in a press conference as saying, “Gay marriage marks the end of the world,” adding:

the world will not have posterity without reproduction between man and woman. Two people of the same sex cannot procreate, meaning that our society will not grow. If we say that we work for our offspring, then who could accept marriage between two people of the same sex?

(Abidjan.net July 8, 2013)

When pushed on the topic a few weeks later, Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara said: “Concerning the declaration on homosexuality, I have nothing to say.

We have laws in Côte d’Ivoire, we have our own traditions. France does what conforms to its traditions. The United States too. And Côte d’Ivoire has its own traditions” (L’info d’Ivory.com July 10, 2013). Although Alternative had received national media attention before the coverage of the French Embassy grant, the assertions of Western meddling put them in the spotlight in a way activists had never previously experienced. After President Obama’s speech in Dakar, rumors began circulating that Côte d’Ivoire was preparing to legalize same-sex marriage. The repeal of DOMA and the passage of the Marriage for All Bill in France in May 2013 coincided with the Ivorian media’s coverage of the ceremony; the connection between Western imperialism and homosexuality was easy to make.

Not all African LGBTI activists set out to obtain foreign funding after launching an SMO. For instance, Sister Namibia, a feminist SMO in Namibia that supported LGBTI rights, functioned informally in its early years. Over time, the SMO consolidated its structure and internal culture.

All of us who joined Sister were interested in the magazine. [W]e called ourselves a collective. So when I joined, we still didn’t have a building; we didn’t have paid staff. We were meeting in private people’s houses. We were stealing paper from various government ministries and photocopying at night or [using] other people’s copying machines and doing the layout by hand. So it was just a collective of women who wanted to make a magazine.

(Rina, interview with Ashley Currier, Windhoek, Namibia, May 23, 2006)

Publishing a feminist magazine sustained Sister Namibia for a few years, as members creatively dealt with meager material resources by taking what they needed wherever they could. Settling into formal routines and growing as a collective, Sister Namibia established a volunteer member management committee and paid staff, who were initially recruited from the cadre of volunteers. “The organization had grown, but our structures hadn’t really. Our [feminist] ideology hadn’t grown with it” (Rina, interview). For a time, a disjuncture existed between volunteers and paid staff. Sister Namibia suffered growing pains, as volunteers chafed against the guidelines paid staff instituted. “There was this kind of feeling [that] … the volunteers are the intellectuals who can lead the organization, who can fundraise, who can do things, and the staff are there to implement” volunteers’ vision and report to the management committee (Rina, interview). Nevertheless, Sister Namibia concentrated decision-making power in members who elected management committee members at the annual general meeting. Friction between staff and volunteers alienated some staff in the mid-1990s, who left the organization and moved on to other job opportunities. Staff outgrew the SMO as Sister Namibia became more engaged with institutional politics, but the organization eventually settled into a comfortable staff and management relationship, aided in part by funding from foreign sources (Currier 2012).

Despite the benevolence associated with using Northern funding to hire unemployed LGBTI constituents, the fact that African LGBTI activists seek
This visibility strategy preserved CEDEP’s anonymity and safety from unwarranted scrutiny. After CEDEP’s leaders began defending LGBTI rights and calling for the decriminalization of same-sex sex publicly, the SMO became a target of political derision in Malawi.

Survival also matters for LGBTI movement supporters. Although HIV/AIDS advocacy had largely escaped negative scrutiny in Malawi, HIV/AIDS activists in Malawi steered their organizations away from unwarranted government attention. Joseph, an HIV/AIDS activist in Malawi, described how his HIV/AIDS organization, MANET+, collaborated with CEDEP to ensure that sexual minorities received HIV/AIDS prevention, education, and treatment services. MANET+ did not press the government to decriminalize same-sex sexual practices. Instead, the organization asked government officials to honor their commitment to include sexual minorities in HIV/AIDS prevention, education, and treatment plans. “For MANET+, arguing for including LGBT persons in HIV/AIDS service provision is ‘a more acceptable way’ of engaging in pro-LGBT advocacy” than demanding the legalization of same-sex sexual practices (Currier 2014: 150). This position has shielded MANET+ from antigay hostility. Without the support of HIV/AIDS and human rights SMOs, CEDEP leaders would likely have experienced difficulty overcoming isolation within Malawian civil society.

Even in countries where same-sex sex is not criminalized, LGBTI activists may conduct their advocacy under the auspices of health and human rights, rather than form an identity movement (Epprecht 2012). Côte d’Ivoire, which is generally seen as moderate on the issue of homosexuality, is one of a handful of sub-Saharan African countries without legislation that criminalizes same-sex sexualities. However, the lack of antigay legislation in Côte d’Ivoire does little to guarantee victimized gender and sexual minorities legal recourse. Yasmin, a travesti who, like many travestis in Abidjan, suffered numerous acts of violence at the hands of military police in the months following the 2011 regime change, explained her reticence in reporting abuse she experienced:

What am I going to go and say? That I am a travesti and that they violated me?… Maybe when I get there, I’ll be locked up for that (being a travesti sex worker). I don’t know. We are violated but we can’t complain. Who are you going to complain to? Who would defend you? Who is going to defend a travesti? I don’t know. If you’re hurt, you care for yourself. You can’t complain. They’re just going to say, “Oh, it’s just a travesti; it’s just a fag.” Whatever. Who’s going to defend you?

(Interview with Yasmin, August 2012)

Similar stories of marginalization and abuse motivate many African gender and sexual minorities to initiate or seek out LGBTI SMOs. In such contexts, many African LGBTI movement leaders continue to face threats of violence and incarceration (Mwakasungula 2013). The future of African LGBTI organizing depends on the survival of individual gender and sexual dissidents.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we emphasize how LGBTI organizing in different African contexts encourages scholars charmed by Northern social movement theories to reconsider the utility of certain binaries, such as “culture” and “politics,” in understanding African LGBTI movement processes. If scholars impose such binaries on African gender and sexual diversity organizing, they will miss out on complicated realities reflected in activists’ simultaneous targeting of different audiences and juggling of multiple projects. For instance, LGBTI organizing is not solely an urban phenomenon. Activism also surfaces in rural areas, as groups of gender and sexually diverse people organize safe spaces, support groups, workshops, and beauty pageants, many of them funded by local residents (Reid 2013).

The impoverishment of African societies by European colonialism and present-day structural adjustment programs has created a sociopolitical environment in which many social movements depend on funding from foreign sources. The neocolonial features of foreign funding and patronage of African social movements in general and LGBTI movements in particular necessitate special scrutiny from social movement scholars. African LGBTI activists have been acutely aware of the awkward dynamics associated with seeking and accepting material support from non-African sources. When southern African LGBTI SMOs launched the All-Africa Rights Initiative in 2004, activists described the initiative as attempting to “respond to human rights crises in Africa with a unified voice, and to share experiences that could lead to greater self-confidence and reduced dependence upon Western gay rights associations and other foreign donors” (Epprecht 2008: 194–195). Future analyses of the transnational features of social movements in the global South should continue to attend to issues of funding, patronage, and dependency, even in “awkward” movements like African LGBTI movements that scholars might not regard as fundable (Polletta 2004).

Finally, considering how the fates of LGBTI constituents and SMOs are intertwined is not merely a theoretical exercise. Instead, it reflects an ongoing aspect of LGBTI organizing, as African activists generate strategies that advance movement objectives without endangering the welfare of individual LGBTI constituents. Social movement scholars have an esteemed history of investigating movements working to restore dignity to poor people’s lives (Piven and Cloward 1977). As the question of survival haunts LGBTI activist efforts, it should also inform scholarly studies of gender and sexual diversity organizing in the global South.

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